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Abstract 
Once a city shaped by the boundary conditions of heavy industrialisation and cheap labour, 
within a few years Seoul has transformed itself to one of the most connected and creative 
metropolises in the world, under the influence of a new set of postindustrial prerogatives: 
consumer choice, instantaneous access to information, and new demands for leisure, luxury, and 
ecological wholeness. The Korean capital stands out for its spatiotemporally compressed 
infrastructural development, particularly in the domain of urban informatics. This chapter 
explores some implications of this compression in relation to Seoulites’ strong desire for 
perpetual connection, a desire that is realised and reproduced through ubiquitous technologies 
connecting individuals both with one another and with the urban environment itself. 
We use the heavily managed urban creek Cheonggyecheon as a metaphor for the technosocial 
milieu of contemporary Seoul, paying particular attention to what its development might signify 
for Seoulites both as a constituent node of the city and as an outcropping of networked 
information technology. We first describe some of the historic, social and economic contexts in 
which the Cheonggyecheon project is embedded, then proceed to discuss the most pertinent 
facets of Korean-style everyday informatics engaged by it: ubiquity; control and overspill; 
government-industry collaboration; lifestyle choice; and condensed development timelines.  
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HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
A stream of fresh water. Shoals of fish orbit in a leisurely manner; curious 
children point them out, all the while being photographed by their delighted 
parents. Through the sound of the running water, surrounded by laughter and the 
little shutter-clicks from cameras and camera phones, a young couple are crossing 
evenly-spaced stepping stones, hand in hand. The air feels lush, fragrant, alive.  
Standing on the many bridges arching over the stream, you realise you are at the 
centre of one of the most populous, polluted, quickly-developing, and densely 
interconnected metropolises on the planet. You are at Cheonggyecheon, in the 
very heart of Seoul. 
Originally stretching ten kilometres from its origin to the point at which it eventually meets the 
Han River, Cheonggyecheon’s history as an urban feature dates to the Joseon Dynasty’s 
selection of Seoul as its new capital, at the beginning of fifteenth century CE. As a restored and 
managed stream, it now runs for almost six kilometres across the central city. 
Recognition of Cheonggyecheon’s potential benefits for Seoul residents was initially realised in 
simple forms: as ‘a sewage system, a laundry and playground for children’ (Park, 2007, p. 9) and 
adults alike (Seoul Development Institute, 2004, p. 1). Its use as an open sewage system 
evidently became unsustainable sometime during the Japanese occupation, leading to a first 
attempt at dredging and partial covering, with the aim of safeguarding Japanese citizens from 
disease and crime (ibid.). However, with the intense national focus on economic reconstruction 
in the post-liberation (1945) and post-war (1953) periods, and a corresponding slide into social 
and environmental negligence on the part of a preoccupied government, attempts at improvement 
fell by the wayside. Cheonggyecheon remained – and was generally perceived as – a perilous 
seam in the fabric of Seoul.  
The stream’s natural flow finally came to an end during Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian 
administration (1961-79), a period in which the thrust toward national greatness was heavily 
predicated on, and identified with, export-oriented industrialisation. During this period, the 
government’s need to make its authority and legitimacy visually manifest in modernisation – 
amidst a broad concomitant suppression of nature, history, and human rights – began to shape 
the city in ways that are still visible today. The result of this approach was evidenced in a 
contemporary statement of Kim Hyeong-ok, then mayor of Seoul: ‘The city is lines.’ Straight 
wires and streets started to replace traditional winding roads. 
As part of this rapid national modernisation process, Cheonggyecheon was filled with cement, 
and was used as the foundation for both local streets and a high-capacity roadway transporting 
products and people in and out of the city centre. This was the height of the period often called 
the ‘miracle on the Han (한강의 기적)’ – approximately three decades from the mid-1960s to 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Kleiner, 2001, p. 254) although the term is generally used to 
refer to the first two decades – in conscious emulation of the postwar West German 
Wirtschaftwunder (economic miracle), or ‘miracle on the Rhine.’ The stream was effectively 
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ploughed under, literally subducted beneath the infrastructural development perceived as 
necessary to the advance of one of Asia’s surging ‘tiger’ or ‘little dragon’ economies. 
During this "Miracle" phase, a large-scale national effort – both the iconography and the 
subjectivity of which frequently involved themes of heroic sacrifice – was directed toward the 
end of rapid economic development. The predominant institutional structure which South Korea 
relied upon to accomplish this breakneck industrialisation was the chaebol, a huge and highly 
centralised, but heavily diversified, family-owned form of business conglomerate with no direct 
comparison in the Western world. 
Chaebol are often compared with the Japanese zaibatsu, written with the same Chinese 
characters. But although they were originally modelled after the Japanese exemplar, during Park 
Chung-hee’s administration, the distinctions between the two institutional forms are more than 
simply a matter of different pronunciation: zaibatsu have the organic means to manage their 
financial sustenance, typically through a network of wholly-owned banks and financial 
institutions, whereas chaebol lack these structures and are thus largely dependent upon the state’s 
tight control over the mobilisation and distribution of financial resources (Chang, 1992, p. 46). 
During the Miracle period, comparatively few chaebol, working in close coordination with 
national government, established Korean competitiveness in shipbuilding, automotive 
manufacture, consumer electronics, and especially construction - first for the domestic and then, 
eventually, for the global market. 
Beneath this ostensibly monolithic surface, things were far from quiescent. It was perhaps 
inevitable that a rapidly-developing nation would experience multiple and major social, political, 
and cultural shifts in the wake of any such breakneck economic expansion, and this is in fact 
precisely what happened: South Korean society experienced simultaneous shifts away from the 
more overt forms of authoritarianism politically, and from a largely agrarian population base 
towards an intense degree of urbanisation demographically and economically (Choe, 2005). 
There were important psychological shifts as well: to some degree, the readiness of the Miracle 
generation to sublimate their personal hopes and dreams to the national good was predicated on 
the belief that their sacrifice would purchase all the fruits of choice (both democratic and 
consumerist) for their children. 
Major democratic reforms were launched in the yearlong run-up to the Seoul Olympics of 1988, 
and were pursued alongside a national agenda of globalisation (segyehwa), which persisted for a 
decade until, in 1997, the Asian economic crisis enveloped the nation. This ultimately led to a 
painful socioeconomic reconfiguration, under a restructuring mandate imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund that was designed to bring Korea into line with the prevailing 
neoliberal international framework (Crotty & Lee, 2006) (or, as one World Bank report calls it, 
the ‘standard Anglo-Saxon blueprint’)(Lee, Kim, Lee, & Yee, 2005, p. 4). 
In the years since the IMF intervention and subsequent renewal of economic growth, Korea has 
gone through yet another dramatic shift, this one flowing outward from the technological and 
cultural industries. This is the so-called ‘Korean Wave’ (Choi, 2008, forthcoming), driven at 
least in part by the widespread local adoption of network technologies, including mobile 
telephony and broadband Internet. 
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Contemporary media-cultural and digital communication developments have occurred in a co-
evolutionary spiral; the Korean Wave itself has been the result of ‘non-static exogenous and 
endogenous convergence processes in an evolving system’ (ibid.) in which the individual user – 
of the city and of informatic apparatuses – plays a crucial role in sustaining and expanding the 
network as a whole. This is a complex and organic infrastructural development linking micro- 
and macro-networks, rather than one that is hierarchically controlled and ordained from the top 
down. It is in this framework that the recuperation of Cheonggyecheon can best be understood as 
symbolic of the paradigmatic shifts now taking place in contemporary Korean society, with its 
new emphasis on individual desire, choice, amenity, and lifestyle.  
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project was launched in 2003 by the then-mayor of Seoul (and 
recently-elected President of South Korea), Lee Myung-bak, as part of a comprehensive ‘public 
betterment’ initiative aimed at improving transportation safety, cultural understanding, and 
industrial, economic, and ecological conditions in areas surrounding the capital (Seoul 
Metropolitan Government, 2002). Within a comparatively short two years, disputes amongst 
various commercial, residential, and political parties were negotiated and resolved through an 
official body consisting of representatives from these and other sectors (known as the "Citizen’s 
Committee"), and the construction of the waterway was completed, at an estimated cost of KRW 
900 billion (approximately EUR 667M / USD 900M). 
The result of this effort was 5.84 kilometres of cleanwater stream, sited between two parallel 
walking paths (See Image 1a) leading from residential suburbs in the east, through industrial and 
commercial districts, into the City Hall (While the neighbourhood where the pathways end is 
undoubtedly the civic and business centre of northern Seoul, it remains a contrast to the younger, 
more fully-developed and more privileged Seoul on the south side of the Han river [See Image 
1b]). 
 
Image 1a 
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Image 1b 
The new Cheonggyecheon serves Seoulites as an open and accessible multi-functional place for 
leisure in and of itself. At the same time, it clearly functions as a space of mobility and flow, a 
conduit connecting multiple sectors of Seoul. This multiplicity of readings, meanings, and uses is 
one of the main characteristics of contemporary urban development in Seoul, a typological 
obscurity that tends to confound simple classification. It is in this respect that Cheonggyecheon 
can be understood to epitomise four factors shaping the technosocial contours of contemporary 
Korean life, four onrushing streams so intricately interbraided that it can be difficult to 
disentangle them: 
 
· As we shall see, Cheonggyecheon captures in its very essence the complicated 
negotiations between flow, control, and more-than-occasional overspill that seem to inhere in 
everyday Korean spatial practice. 
 
· The institutional framework within which the creek was developed demonstrates the 
way in which, compared to Western democracies particularly, South Korean society depends on 
a high degree of coordination between government and industry (chaebol in particular) in 
determining urban, industrial, and technological policy. 
 
· Finally, the compressed timeline of the creek’s redevelopment project reflects the 
prevailing ppali-ppali (hurry hurry / 빨리빨리) ethos, signalling both ‘hastiness’ and 
‘dynamism’ (Kang, 2006, p. 47) in adopting and adapting to technological and social change. 
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· In the wake of the transition to a postindustrial economy, Cheonggyecheon’s role as a 
symbol and manifestation of leisure space/time epitomises the broad public endorsement of a 
hedonic agenda, dedicated to consumer choice, the pursuit of the ‘noble’ life, and perhaps even 
a greater awareness of and respect for the natural environment.  
 
We argue that these factors are likely to shape the experience of ubiquitous and ambient 
informatics not merely within Korea, but – owing to Korea’s emerging status as a leading 
exporter of technical products, components, and frameworks – globally as well. We begin our 
discussion by examining the concept of computational ubiquity in the context of contemporary 
Seoul, and then proceed to a discussion of each of these four factors in detail. 
 
UBIQUITY 
In order to situate the contemporary desire for ambient informatics correctly, it is necessary to 
first understand that the everyday Korean experience of information technology is already one of 
ubiquity: in his article, ‘Seoul: birth of a broadband metropolis,’ Townsend (2007) cites 2004 
government figures claiming 80% household broadband penetration, one of the highest rates in 
the world, while the International Telecommunication Union has placed Korea at the top of its 
Digital Opportunity Index for the two years 2005 and 2006 (International Telecommunication 
Union, 2006). 
In such an environment, Internet-derived conventions become part of the daily lingua franca, 
with manifestations such as emoticons – for example, (^_^) – rendered without explanation in 
newspaper headlines, or in branding intended for the mass audience. Technical terms and jargon 
infiltrate everyday life, in a way that is clearly beneficial to those institutions with something at 
stake in the mass adoption of technology. One result of this is that the single Koreanized-English 
word “ubiquitous,” and the u- prefix derived from it (e.g. "u-City," see Hwang in this volume), is 
now commonly understood by the general public to refer to a technological regime positioned as 
desirable; an example epitomizing two of the aspects discussed in this paper is a current slogan 
used by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), ‘Happy U-life that do with U-
Korea realization.’ 
This is nowhere more visible than at Cheonggyecheon, where government policy, aspirational 
ubiquity, and public space have become fused to a degree that is hard to convey to those 
unfamiliar with the Korean way of doing and making things. The official government portal 
Korea.net invites residents and visitors to ‘Experience Ubiquitous Seoul at Cheonggyecheon 
Event,’ where they might enjoy a ‘rush of high-tech cyberspace and nature in one central-Seoul 
spot’ (Korea.net, 2007). 
By re-designating the stream ‘U-Cheonggyecheon,’ and touting the deployment of high-tech 
assemblies to ‘monitor its purity and water and pollution levels,’ the notion of technological 
testbed is collapsed against that of riverbed. Once thus embedded, visitors can indulge 
themselves in technologically-enhanced leisure with a frisson of ecological responsibility, 
interacting with features such as ‘Free Board' (a digital bulletin board on which the user can 
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create their own multimedia content, and email it for free); a touch-screen based ‘Interactive 
Media Board' providing a variety of information about Cheonggyecheon; and LED-equipped 
street lamps, which are also Internet hotspots in disguise (ibid.).  
If, as an unnamed Seoul Metropolitan official explains, this overcoded space is explicitly a 
‘standard model and guide for other ubiquitous projects,’ it is not the only one. Although 
sponsored by the private Korea Home Network Industries Association, the Ubiquitous Dream 
Hall displays cutting-edge domestic technologies in a privileged home on the grounds of the 
Ministry of Information and Communication, literally across the street from historic 
Gyeongbokgung Palace, while visions of domestic Weiseriana are presented to consumers in 
seasonal exhibitions like the popular Daelim Model House, in the fashionable, upper-class 
Apgujeong neighbourhood. 
All of these manifestations enthusiastically embrace, to a degree that tends no longer to be the 
case among Western technology vendors, the traditional Weiserian vision of ubiquitous 
computing as heavily-instrumented space (cf. Bell & Dourish, 2007; Weiser, 1995), and are in 
turn welcomed with equal gusto by a nation of consumers increasingly primed to regard such 
technological interventions as de rigeur appurtenances of the good life. Indeed, during the 
exhibition’s season, long lines of would-be residents file through the dazzling, spacious dream 
apartments; Image 2 shows the files of bowing, elegantly-dressed models deployed to greet their 
tour buses on arrival. 
 
Image 2 
Here visions of computational ubiquity are closely coupled to notions of ease, leisure, and 
luxury, which may go some way toward explaining why MIC’s vision for rolling out next-
generation ubiquity, the so-called ‘IT 839 Strategy,’ enunciates a (somewhat peculiar for a 
highly technical infrastructure-development program) success metric of GDP USD 30,000 per 
capita. There is no doubt that a vision of robust domestic ubiquity is latent in the ‘eight services, 
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three infrastructures [and] nine growth engines’ enumerated in IT 839 (see Table 1), which also 
claims the emergent WiBro (wireless broadband) and DMB (digital multimedia broadcasting) 
standards as Korean innovations. But is it a particularly Korean one? 
 
Table 1. Adapted from MIC (2005) 
The implied seamless model of spatiality – with no differentials or gradients of access within it – 
embraced by the IT 839 strategy is somewhat at variance with the way ubiquitous urban 
informatics are currently experienced in the everyday life of Seoul, an experience whose features 
are largely shaped by the unique ‘bang (room)’ culture of Korea. Translating ‘bang’ as ‘room,’ 
however, threatens to obliterate a variety of meaningful distinctions between the typologies, 
distinctions that clearly condition the type, timing, and intensity of social activities that take 
place within. 
In contrast to the general understanding of a ‘room’ embedded in Western spatial practice – a 
single-purpose space, designed, designated, and provisioned for a specific function – bangs in 
traditional Korean culture are generally required to support a multiplicity of functions, and are 
provisioned accordingly. Take, for example, the custom of serving food on low tables that can be 
folded away. It was a common practice (and still is, in small residential spaces) for the living 
room to be metamorphosed into the dining room when the table is set up, for it then to be 
converted for study during the evening, and finally into a bedroom at night, when yo (Korean 
futon) are unfolded on the floor. This inherent reconfigurability of domestic space has become 
commercialised in the contemporary Seoul urbanscape (in fact, by the chaebol themselves, in the 
appointments of their large-scale developments), blurring the border between what is imagined 
and lived as private and as public. 
The following excerpt from Sung Hong Kim’s curatorial statement (Kim, 2004) for the Korean 
Pavilion at the 9th Architecture Biennale of Venice – themed City of the Bang – aptly captures 
the essence of this culture: 
[B]ang has infiltrated the Korean urban landscape of commercialized space with 
enterprises such as the PC bang, Video bang, Norae bang, Jjimjil bang, Soju bang, and 
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others. The Norae bang, a scaled-down version of the Karaoke bar, is the primeval cave 
festival in the midst of the contemporary city. Visual, audible, olfactory, tactile, and 
gustatory sensations are simultaneously experienced in this tiny black box. Meanwhile, 
the Jjimjil bang, which combines a steam bath, fitness room, lounge, restaurant, and 
sleeping area, provides space where half-clothed bodies intersperse between a variety of 
functional areas. The Jjimjil bang blurs the lines between the collective and the 
individual, normal and deviant behaviour, privacy and voyeurism. The bang is an 
incarnation of the room, the house and the city, but it does not belong to any of them. The 
city of the bang oscillates between the domestic realm, institutionalized place, and urban 
space. 
Like the majority of other interior spaces in South Korea, most bangs are now heavily mediated 
and connected via broadband internet, providing additional opportunities for instant and 
spontaneous connection through geo-social mobility (bangs as decentralised connection points), 
and at the same time, constant and now ‘given’ connection through immobility (bangs as 
physically and socially constrained spaces) (Choi, 2007b; cf. Hjorth, 2007 on 
mobility/immobility). Ubiquitous computing, in this sense, is socially established and 
experienced through multiple overlaying infrastructural arrangements, both tangible and 
intangible, giving a sense of what Bell and Dourish call ‘messiness’ (2007, pp. 139-141) and 
what we have here termed overspill.  
 
CONTROL AND OVERSPILL 
A sense of boundaries being overrun is also inherent to Cheonggyecheon, albeit primarily 
through its absence or negation ("control"). Over time, the primary aim of the various 
governmental efforts at managing the creek have concerned the relationship between useful, life-
giving flow and an undesirable overspill, with more or less heavy-handed interventions aimed at 
limiting the latter. The first known project on the site was one devoted to the control of seasonal 
flooding, ordered by King Taejong in 1406. Such flooding continued to occur despite near-
continual efforts at intervention, with the most recent taking place in 2001 (though it was of a 
minor class, and water only flowed into the underground level).  
If Castells (1989) characterised the modern world as a ‘space of flows,’ Seoul embodies this in 
several respects. Some days everything in the city seems to have slipped its bounds: the stuff of 
apartment lives tumbles onto balconies – ‘verandas displaying racks of drying laundry, 
children’s bicycles, and brown pottery jars for staple condiments and kimchi,’ as noted by 
Nelson (2004, p. 5); clubs, parties, conversations, arguments and even commercial services 
extend heedless into the street (Lee, 2004, pp. 74-75); restaurants seem to store half their 
crockery on the sidewalk. Meanwhile, omnipresent Columbia and UCLA sweatshirts stand as 
synecdoche for the continual flux of traffic both cargo and passenger between Incheon Airport 
and New York and Los Angeles, the latter city enjoying the second-largest Korean population on 
the planet. The cultural roots of Korean identity are certainly felt, but what is visible is a hybrid, 
an overcoded overspill of cultural eclectics and constant negotiation.  
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Just as subject to change, perhaps surprisingly, is the visual envelope and appearance of local 
buildings. Amongst arrays of identical, matchbox-like apartment buildings in the 
Apgujeongdong district is the Galleria department store (see Image 3), the entire façade of which 
is made up of networked, programmable display elements capable of generating 16 million 
colours (Arup, 2004). Here, spatial demarcation becomes obscured, and space itself thus 
becomes a fundamentally subjective experience, conceptually and sensorially. Through grids of 
such connected lights, Seoul becomes the ‘circuit city’ (Vanderbilt, 2005) where individual 
narratives flow together to create a common history. 
 
Image 3 
Seoul is found in the flux hinging between control and overspill: the circuit city of bangs, of 
screens, and in flux (Choi, 2007a). How is such a city managed politically and economically 
today? We point to the concept of chaebol to answer this question. 
 
CHAEBOL NATION 
As a high-profile, high-prestige development in the very core of the capital city, 
Cheonggyecheon’s recent evolution would be hard to imagine without the involvement of the 
chaebol, as contractors and executors of the national will. It is almost impossible to overstate the 
influence these massive business combines have on Korean life: the commercial hegemony 
established by the chaebol early on in the post-Korean War reconstruction effort, and 
consolidated in the Park Chung-hee years, continues to be manifested in the Korean landscape, 
literally in concrete – not least in the arrays of identical housing blocks that cover the city and the 
countryside beyond in endless domino ranks, each proudly emblazoned with its corporate logo 
(see Image 4). 
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Image 4 
A drive from central Seoul to one of its outlying newtowns simultaneously epitomises how far 
into daily life the chaebol reach, and captures something of the current national mood. 
Accessible via Cheonggyecheon walking paths, Doota, or Doosan Tower, is one of the biggest 
and most well-known shopping malls in the popular fashion district of Namdaemun, while the 
same conglomerate has recently (2005) developed an entire edge-city newtown near Seoul. This 
scale of private development is by no means considered particularly excessive by local 
standards; as their primary slogan – We’ve – boasts, Doosan is a conglomerate whose business 
interests reach from wine production and ownership of a baseball team to the design and 
construction of surface-to-air missile systems. 
Indeed, nothing is more ubiquitous in Korea than the chaebol, and none of the chaebol is more 
ubiquitous than Samsung: as the Seoul-based net artists Y0UNG-HAE CHANG HEAVY 
INDUSTRIES (http://www.yhchang.com), themselves named in parodic imitation of chaebol, 
point out, one can be born in a Samsung hospital, attend a Samsung school, marry in a Samsung 
chapel, live in a Samsung home, and be buried in a Samsung casket (“Samsung will help me get 
over being dead...and being alive”). 
It is only natural, therefore, that the chaebol loom large in any Korean discussion of ubiquitous 
development, both at the level of infrastructure (Doosan has a business unit dedicated to 
"ubiquitous framework standardisation") and consumer-grade interfaces, nor that governmental 
specification of the relevant technical standards is pursued in close cooperation with them. The 
emphasis on institutional coordination has clear implications for the prospective development of 
ambient informatics, not always those that an onlooker might be tempted to imagine. More 
specifically, programs undertaken in the light of close chaebol-governmental cooperation would 
appear to benefit from: 
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· a markedly accelerated speed of development, in accord with the ppali-ppali mentality; 
· a certain consistency of aspiration and execution, especially as concerns the production of 
physical space, with the associated desires reproduced and diffused via the single, centralized 
national media market; and 
· increased interoperability among and between communication devices and platforms, 
resulting in a smoother and more fluid user experience. 
Not all of these things are necessarily true. However tempting it may be – however often their 
policies seem to evolve in tune with the personal desires of one or another charismatic chairman, 
even when that desire contravenes general business ethics or an obvious profit motive – the 
chaebol cannot be thought of as monolithic organisations. The chaebol, by and large, are in fact 
internally heterogeneous, with sub-companies, divisions and business units run by other 
members of the family (siblings or cousins, for example) each of which will retain a certain level 
of autonomy.  
Particularly, the fact that chaebol are not simple monoliths can lead to user experiences that are 
sporadic and disconnected. From this perspective, the chaebols’ internal heterogeneity means 
that devices bearing the Samsung or the LG brand were likely developed by entirely discrete 
design organisations, with no overlap of personnel, process, or practice. Despite the Weiserian 
promise to ‘encalm as well as inform’ (Greenfield, 2006, p. 29), very few of the current 
generation of Korean-designed digital tools have the same interfaces, very few of them work 
well together or have been designed with seemingly any recognition that their actual 
environment of use would likely be one of saturation and synchrony. (In fairness, the same 
situation is true of both Japanese and Western commercial competitors and “free” or open-source 
alternatives, with few exceptions, however, the design organisation is internally organised. The 
point is merely that the apparent homogeneity of the chaebol confers no evident benefit to users 
of products and services they design and bring to market.) 
There is also a clear question as to whether what is good for the chaebol is good for Korea. In 
criticising excessive urban renewal occurring in South Korea, Yim (2006, pp. 116-117) argues 
that an average of 50-60 percent of the total profit generated by Korean construction industry 
comes from apartment construction, which amounts to approximately 8% of the national GDP. 
This massive incentive, he further asserts, leads to chaebol promoting the physically higher, 
high-tech, and highly self-contained (and thus isolated) living environment of the apartment 
complex as an aspirational image for ‘good living.’ Clearly, chaebol produce space and fill it 
with their increasingly networked products and services. This environment, people are constantly 
persuaded, is one in which the resident can remain safe, secure and comfortable, while managing 
every outward-facing aspect of their lives via fluid high-speed connections: a utopia of privilege, 
reserved for those who are worthy of the ‘noble life.’    
  
NOBLESSE OBLIGE 
Across the hoardings where a new apartment development will rise in trendy Apgujeongdong are 
emblazoned the words The Noble Community; nearby, a bus-shelter ad urges waiting passengers 
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to consume, For your nobility life. There’s even a (high)life-style magazine, positioned 
somewhere between Vogue and Architectural Digest, called Noblesse (노블레스). This is 
nothing if not a culture that wears its aspirations – like its brand names – on its sleeve. 
So what counts as noble here? Judging from the images splashed across those same hoardings, 
three times as large as life: bowls, handkerchiefs, and umbrellas monogrammed with Italianate 
names. Tumi wheelaways, bottles of Johnny Walker Black clanking dully in the duty-free bag. 
Enough time to play golf and to visit the wonders of the world. (Another development, Polus, 
modestly compares itself to the Taj Mahal, the Sagrada Familia, the Arc de Triomphe, and the 
Empire State Building.  Its slogan: "Over the borderline & Over the luxury” – see Image 5) 
 
Image 5 
The trappings of nobility even extend to the architecture of the body. In this context, ‘noble’ 
means smaller faces - sleeker, but retaining enough space for the bigger, rounder, doll-like eyes 
and higher nose. This is the new popular Korean-Western aesthetic, smooth, synthetic, and 
purchased. Although this vision of what constitutes the noble is not universally held, it is a 
broadly popular one, and to a significant degree it informs what happened at Cheonggyecheon: a 
perfected stream forged for the pleasure of a perfected population. 
 
This new ‘skin job’ aesthetic, with its unachievable limit-case dream of nanometer-smooth 
surfaces, can contrast with the reality of Seoul’s urban fabric, in places starkly. Across the river 
from Cheonggyecheon, a pedestrian bridge runs south from Banpodong’s Express Bus Terminal 
across six lanes of traffic; with its dramatic uplighting, sharply-raked struts and pointless blue 
Ming the Merciless flanges, it looks like an escapee from William Gibson’s "Gernsback 
Continuum." To gaze upon this bridge from far away, or to drive under it at speed, especially at 
night, is to enter a city that still lives mostly in the renderings favoured by Seoul’s developers 
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and civic boosters (and in subway-ad versions of which a ‘re-gooded’ Cheonggyecheon figured 
heavily, for years before its unveiling). Urban furniture like this bridge, along with new subway 
lines and new building complexes, and enough English signage to tie them all together, were 
trotted out for the 1988 Olympics (which resulted in top-down democratic reforms), and then 
again for the 2002 World Cup (during which brigades of Red Devils, a Korean soccer 
supporters’ club which was organised from the bottom up, gained international attention). 
 
These two events, and all the impedimenta introduced in their wake, were intended to usher this 
proud city at long last through the velvet rope and into the ‘world class,’ an ambition clearly 
stated in the Seoul Olympics’ very slogan, Seoul to the World, the World to Seoul (서울은 
세계로, 세계는 서울로). However, the pedestrian crossing the bridge may see something else 
entirely. At close range, one cannot help but notice that the welds on its steps and stanchions are 
sloppy, incontinent, gappy, and that the translucent blue wings have long gone dull with wear. 
The bridge is not an aberration, an outlier. In its haphazardness, the pedestrian bridge joins the 
rivets of the girders holding up a parking garage at the Yongsan Electronics Market, the 
unfinished light wells in the ceiling of a high-end hotel’s lobby, and the letter “E” that for many 
years hung ten degrees off true, five stories up, on the side of the Newcore shopping center. The 
whole city, in fact, can feel to a visitor very much as if it has been assembled so quickly that 
large parts of it are in imminent danger of falling apart entirely; various observers (e.g. Feffer, 
2003) ascribe this to the perceived need to ppali-ppali on the way to yet another economic 
Miracle. 
While the ppali-ppali mode has seen South Korea make its entry to the domain of developed 
nations in impressively short order, this has been won at the cost of serious, and occasionally 
fatal, consequences – most notably, the 1995 Sampoong Department Store collapse, in which 
937 people were injured and a further 501 lost their lives. The implications of a continued 
reliance on ppali-ppali for any domain of development as sensitively dependent on accurate 
configuration and ongoing maintenance as the deployment of ubiquitous information 
technologies are significant. Physical danger from faulty, undertested or undershielded devices is 
one possibility, especially with base stations and other high-energy retransmission equipment 
being placed in far closer proximity to living and sleeping quarters than would be considered 
prudent in the West. Just as evident, however, is a cavalier attitude with regard to less tangible 
potential hazards of ubiquity, privacy concerns, and so-called ‘digital divide' issues chief among 
them (Bell & Dourish, 2007, p. 138). (The latter is a problem that is already apparent in Korea 
despite, and paradoxically exacerbated by, the high-broadband penetration rate in urban areas; 
the Internet is now perceived to be so unremarkably vital to the management of everyday life that 
those without access are doubly disadvantaged.)  
The tension between the reality resulting from ppali-ppali development and visions of the noble 
is acute, but generally addressed only obliquely. One manifestation, however, is that Koreans 
find it increasingly hard to accept the natural, with all its inescapable imperfections and 
variations from the statistical norm as evidenced in the rising popularity of plastic surgery; a 
study shows that approximately 81.5% of women between the ages of 25 and 29 feel that they 
need cosmetic surgery and 61.5% of them have already had more than one surgery done (Kim, 
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2007). Particularly in conjunction with the traditional collective mentality, in which deviance is 
deplored (Triandis & Suh, 2002), reparative cosmetic surgery becomes desirable not only for 
people, but also for the environment – an aspect for which the Cheonggyecheon restoration 
project has been heavily criticised as a costly urban facelift. It remains to be seen whether this 
wide pursuit of perfection and consumerist nobility can do anything other than create everyday 
predicaments, imperfectly concealed in the compressed timeframe of urgent development. 
Nevertheless, we can at least be certain of the destination to which all of these efforts are 
supposed to lead: a life of happiness.  
 
HAPPY FOREVER 
At the end of 2007, Samsung Anycall launched an advertising campaign urging people to Talk, 
Play, Love. While this slogan is incessantly animated across the brilliantly-coloured display 
façade of the aforementioned Galleria department store, Samsung presents another message on a 
huge video billboard in central Seoul, this one in English: Happy Forever. The context in which 
these slogans – so easily perceived by Western observers as Orwellian, even Stepfordian – are 
encountered suggests three things: these words accurately capture a mass aspiration in the 
contemporary Korean soul; they are meant literally; and they are meant seriously. 
The word ‘happy,’ particularly, seems to occupy the place in the popular Korean imaginary that 
‘dream’ does for many Japanese. However, whereas ‘dream’ generally suggests a state that is 
aspirational, and thus perhaps eternally deferred, ‘happy’ connotes a state that a person might 
reasonably expect to achieve in the course of ordinary existence. ‘Happy,’ for this audience only 
a very few decades removed from the most harrowing imaginable experience of wartime 
suffering and deprivation, is not outside history; it is meant to be realised in the here and now. 
The chaebol, with their multipronged need to shift products and sell services, can often lend the 
impression that quality of life is a matter primarily of infrastructural technical innovation, rather 
than anything conventionally subsumed under the rubric of urbanism. High-quality urban 
environments are increasingly perceived by South Koreans as something to be planned, budgeted 
for, and delivered politically, commercially, and quickly, and not something forged in the 
contestation and negotiation of uses for public space, let alone in the active participation of 
residents qua citizens (cf. Gelézeau, 2007; Yim, 2006; Yang, 2005). 
At this point, we ask, largely but admittedly not entirely in the spirit of devil’s advocacy, if this 
city-as-lifestyle-as-service – where happiness itself is constructed as something consumed (cf. 
Luke, 2005) rather than participated in (cf. Rheingold, 2008, forthcoming) – is perceived by the 
overwhelming majority of its users as delivering value and satisfaction reliably and consistently, 
what benefit would be served by the minority, non-participant observers, advancing claims to the 
contrary? What would raising such claims do but complicate the swift and smooth delivery of 
services to the people who have freely engaged them? (Such an assertion would certainly seem 
to be among the many messages laminated into the recent victory of Lee Myung-bak.) 
Given such conditions, democracy itself – defined as a process that attempts to balance interests 
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through a satisficing churn of discourse, deliberation, and disputation on the part of nearly all of 
the members of a community – may come to be deprecated locally, yielding perhaps to a softer 
strain of that authoritarian/consumerist fusion which finds its fullest contemporary expression in 
the People's Republic of China. 
Those children whose democratic and economic entitlement had to be fought for by the Miracle 
generation are now parents of their own children – perhaps those we last saw curiously pointing 
at the shoals of fish at Cheonggyecheon. Looking at these children play, one might almost 
imagine that the balance of their lives will unfold as serenely and as generously as a late-spring 
day, in both material and spiritual registers; that happiness is truly something to which one might 
subscribe; that most if not all will be able to do so; and that it will all last.  
In the late Joseon period, a noted poet and scholar, Lee Duk-moo, wrote a poem called Song of 
the Full Moon depicting a joyous scene of people waiting for the full moon on a bridge over 
Cheonggyecheon: 
雪色澄明惟此宵 유독 오늘밤은 달빛이 맑고 밝아 
Tonight snow is auspiciously bright and clear 
人人候月廣通橋 사람마다 광통교에서 달을 기다린다 
Everyone waits for the moon on the Gwangtong Bridge 
歌童一隊聯群袂 노래하는 아이들 한무리가 여러 옷깃을 이어 
A group of children bridge their collars together 
齊唱東方行樂調 동방의 행락조를 함께 부르네 
Singing the song of joy from the East 
 
For the Korea(n)s, this imagined and long-deferred happiness may finally be realised in this city 
conceived – however rightly or wrongly – as a machine capable of delivering the good life to the 
majority of the people who live in it. Whether any such state can be lived as and in reality 
remains open to question, but we see an undeniable promise in the optimism so abundantly 
evident at Cheonggyecheon, and elsewhere in the streets of contemporary Seoul. This optimism 
inheres not least, perhaps, in the rise of technologies able to support collaborative efforts 
amongst individuals, who are together able to reimagine their once-guarded, isolar and literally 
defended city as a connected space, to and within which access is open and flexible. 
For our own part, we believe that the ongoing convergence – imagined, in process, and lived – 
between what Seoul is and what it could be must occur organically, true to the desires and 
intentions of the Korean people. We remain hopeful that appropriately-designed ubiquitous 
technology will indeed empower people towards this end, and that we will once again witness 
(though in a vastly different technosocial context) Seoulites from diverse backgrounds coming 
together as joyously and hopefully as those depicted in the Song of the Full Moon.  
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